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RVANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT DElWIDS.

A. Long term ( see our political programme)
B. Short term:
1. CEASEFIRE

- The ceasefire is not an end in itself. It should be part of a
package of definitive solutions to the problemes in the country.
- The government of Rwanda should make specific commitments to agree
on the principles of power sharing arrangements as well as the
integration of the two armies to form a national army as
preconditions for the ceasefire.
- To ensure that the ceasefire holds, and apart from the conditions
stipulated in the N'sele agreement:
a. There should be a neutral zone separating the two armies.
b. There should be a neutral monitoring force whose size, status
and terms of reference are agreed upon by the two parties. This
includes when the said monitoring force should be commissioned
and when it should be decommissioned.
c. There should be a definitive time frame within which the
ceasefire should be implemented.
d. There should be a sequence of events leading from the cessation
of hostilities to the complete implementation of the peace
accord.
e. There should be clear arrangements to provide resources
necessary for the monitaring force to play its role
independently and effectively.
f. Although the amended N'sele agreement of 16th September 1991
does not include both the RPF and the Rwanda government as
members of the monitoring force, there should be a mechanism by
which the two parties can participate in the working of the
monitoring team. This would not only be a confidence building
measure but also of practical significance.
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2. TRANSITIONAL POllER SHARING ARRANGEMENTS.
- Rationale:
a. It is a logical outcome of any negotiated settlement.
b. It is both a political and administrative safeguard.
-Nature:
There should be a national council which is broadbased and which
has full executive and legislative powers. This national council
should preside over the interim period.
- Interim programme:
There should be a clear interim programme.

This should include:

a. The completion of the integration of the two armies and the
formation of a national army.
b. Return, resettlement and integration of refugees and other
displaced persons.
c. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of war ravaged areas.
d. Administrative and Political reforms necessary to ensure a
genuine democratization process and foster national unity.
e. Constitutional arrangements.
f. Organizing a national debate on the future of the country.
g. Preparing and carrying out elections.
h. Any other programme agreed upon by the governing national
council.
- Interim period:
There should be adequate time to implement the above programme.
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3. INTEGRATION OF THE TVO !ID!IES AND FOlUIATION OF A NATIONAL AR1IY.

- Rationale:
a. The present army in Rwanda is a factional army which cannot be
relied upon to guarantee the security of the Rwandese people and
their property.
The same army is responsible for many crimes
against the Rwandese people and cannot therefore be trusted to
safeguard the democratization process.
b. It is a right of every eligible Rwandese citizen to be part of
the national army if he/she so wishes.
- Nature:
a. Determination of the size of the national army.
b. Determination of numbers that each side will contribute to the
national army.
c. Criteria to determine eligibility to join the national army.
d. Training and equiping the national army.
e. The demobilization process will involve rehabilitation,
resettlement and integration of those not absorbed in the
national army into other activities.
f. Reform of the other security institutions.
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